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"SUPREME COURT TV": TELEVISING THE LEAST
ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH?
Bruce G. Peabody*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR BIPARTISANSHIP AND THE 1 10TH CONGRESS
The midterm elections of 2006 ushered in the return of divided government,I with
different parties in control of the White House and United States Congress. This
electoral shift has renewed talk of Congress's central role in national policymaking and
prompted pundits and politicians to resume calls for bipartisan lawmaking.2  As
President George Bush claimed during a press conference held in November 2006, "it is
now our duty to put the elections behind us and work together with the Democrats and
independents" to find "common ground. ' 3  When the 110th Congress convened in
January 2007, its leaders reiterated this pledge of cooperation between the parties.
"Guided by the spirit of bipartisanship," said new Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid,
we "are ready to take this country in a new direction.'
4
Historically, however, constructing this shared policy agenda has been an elusive
and delicate undertaking. And in the immediate future, institutional cooperation may be
especially difficult given the electoral competitiveness of the two major parties, 5 and the
. Associate Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Madison, New Jersey. B.A., 1991,
Wesleyan University; Ph.D., 2000, University of Texas at Austin. The author thanks Scott Gant, Hannibal
Kemerer, Bruce Larson and Adam Rappaport for their assistance in developing this Article.
I. Since 1980, the federal government has featured unified party rule infrequently: from 1993-1994,
during part of 2001, and from 2003-2006. See, e.g., Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives,
Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present),
http://clerk.house.gov/arthistory/house.-history?partyDiv.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Party
Divisions of the House]; Senate Historical Office, U.S. Senate, Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one item-and-teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007);
The White House, Presidents of the United States-Presidents By Date,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/chronologica.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
2. Rick Klein, President, Pelosi Talk of Bipartisanship, Bush Reoffers Controversial UN Envoy Pick,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2006, at A2; Eric Pianin, McConnell Pledges Cooperation, New GOP Leader Vows
to Work With Democrats on Legislation. WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2006, at A2 1; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Pelosi
Ready for House Helm, Battle Over Issues, CNN.com, Nov. 9, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/l 1/08/pelosi.speaker (Speaker-elect Nancy Pelosi expressing her desire
to go in a "new direction," emphasizing bipartisanship).
3. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., President's News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOc. 2023 (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-2.html.
4. John M. Broder, Jubilant Democrats Assume Control on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at
AI (discussing Democrats' taking control of the new Congress).
5. The relatively close party divide in the House of Representatives (233 Democrats, 202 Republicans
in the House of Representatives for the 110th Congress) is somewhat offset by lawmakers' success in drawing
congressional districts that tend to be non-competitive. Party Divisions of the House, supra note 1. Since
most districts are constructed to favor one party decisively over the other, electoral competition tends to be
somewhat limited in recent Congresses. See Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deep Red and Blue Congressional
Districts: The Causes and Consequences of Declining Party Competitiveness, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2004) (discussing the incidence and effects of partisan
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related likelihood that political control of both the White House and Congress will be
genuinely contested during 2008. Moreover, scholarship suggests that party divisions
are notably deep in the current era.6 At least in terms of votes in Congress, the past
twenty years have seen legislators adhering to their respective party line ever more
tightly; that is, they are much more reluctant than in the past to break from their party's
preferred policy positions-to "cross the aisle" and vote for a measure supported by the
opposition. 7 Additionally, a number of commentators have suggested that leaders in the
110th Congress face the enduring difficulty of trying to bring unity to the disparate
ideological, geographic, and issue-oriented groups within the two major parties.
8
II. TELEVISING THE LEAST ACCOUNTABLE BRANCH?
Given these potentially shearing political forces, what specific issues could bring
together partisans and officials who appear to be so opposed? One possibility is that
lawmakers might find common ground by training their attention on the Supreme
Court-an institution that has, in recent years, been criticized by a wide spectrum of
public officials, including representatives from both major parties, as well as Congress
and the White House.9 Since the 1990s, the Court has invalidated (sometimes widely
popular) federal legislation at a rate not seen since the advent of the New Deal. 10 The
Court's decisions over this period have frequently inflamed both the left and the right-
sometimes at the same time.11
gerrymandering in Congress).
6. See, e.g., PIETRO S. NIVOLA & DAVID W. BRADY, RED AND BLUE NATION?: CHARACTERISTICS AND
CAUSES OF AMERICA'S POLARIZED PARTIES 1-47 (2006). See generally JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB
POLITICS: HOW PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2006) (discussing political
tactics and dynamics in the House of Representatives that have exacerbated partisan divisions within the
institution); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS FAILING
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006) (identifying partisanship as one of the ills of the
contemporary Congress); Tom Balz and Jim VandeHei, GOP Moderates' Ouster Widens House Divide,
WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2006 at A10 (discussing the effects of the 2006 congressional midterm elections in
"widening the ideological divisions that have contributed to partisanship and gridlock on Capitol Hill"); John
W. Dean, Are Congressional Wars Coming? Since Cheney Has Already Said He'll Ignore the Democratic
Congress, It Seems Likely, FINDLAW, Dec. 01, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20061201.html
(discussing partisan tensions between the Bush administration and Democrats in Congress).
7. See, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF ROLL CALL VOTING 229-32 (Oxford University Press 2000); DAVID H. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN
THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 162-92 (Univ. Chicago Press 199 1).
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 2 (quoting scholar Thomas Mann who claims that the challenge for
the new speaker "and the other leaders is going to be to find issues that unify the various wings of the
[Democratic] party").
9. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS vii-xi, 162-64, 236-39 (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006)
(decrying Supreme Court decisions opposing the Bush Administration); Bruce Peabody, Congress, the Court,
and the "Service Constitution: " Article III Jurisdiction Controls as a Case Study of the Separation of Powers,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 269 (2006) [hereinafter Service Constitution]; Robert Post, Congress and the Court,
132 DiEDALUS, Summer 2003, at 5 (2003).
10. See Post, supra note 9, at 5-6, THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN
HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 1-2 (Univ. Chi. Press 2004); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 87 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., Duke Univ. Press 2005).
1I. Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on Property; Federal Funds
Tied to Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at Al (quoting former House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay's criticisms of the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. City of New London); Hillary Rodham Clinton &
Goodwin Liu, Separation Anxiety: Congress, the Courts, and the Constitution, 91 GEO. L. REV. 439, 449
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Congressional leaders have seemed uncertain about how to deal with this perceived
institutional "activism."' 12  Some lawmakers have proposed initiatives to trim the
Court's budget, impeach individual Justices, or employ Congress's authority under
Article III of the Constitution to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear cases involving
certain substantive areas, such as abortion. 13 On the whole, these measures have failed
to attract sustained popular attention and legislative support.
The new Congress, however, will consider a bill that could succeed where these
other "Court curbing" initiatives have failed. On January 22, 2007, Senator Arlen
Specter introduced S. 344, a "bill to permit the televising of Supreme Court
proceedings."' 14  Specter's bill would drag the Supreme Court into the twentieth
century, never mind the twenty-first, by requiring television coverage of the Court's
open sessions. The measure includes what might be described as a civil liberties
"loophole"--permitting a "majority of [fJustices" to discontinue the broadcasts in a
particular case if they believe that televising these proceedings would "constitute a
violation of the due process rights of [one] or more of the parties before the Court."'
15
In all other cases, however, the presumption is that the cameras will roll.
In recent years, scholars, judges, and commentators have surfaced a number of
purported benefits and drawbacks to proposals, like Specter's, that would expand
television coverage of federal judicial proceedings. 16  Typically, these debates have
focused on policy assessments--on the supposed impact the legislation would have on
the operation of our courts or the public's attitudes towards the judiciary.
Opponents have claimed that bills like S. 344 would compromise the anonymity,
and, in turn, the security, of Supreme Court Justices. Moreover, they fear that televising
(2003) (warning about "the imperial tendencies of the current Court"); Press Release, Rep. Ron Lewis,
Accountability for Judicial Activism Act Introduced in House (June 30, 2005).
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ky02_lewis/SCOTUS.html (introducing a bill enabling Congress to
reverse constitutional judgments of the Court); Rich Lowry, "Mad Max" Stands with the Right, A Left-Right
Coalition for Property, NAT'L REV., Aug. 5, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/
lowry200508050737.asp (discussing Democrat Maxine Waters' strong opposition to the Kelo decision);
Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQ. 127, 151-156 (2004) [hereinafter Congressional
Interpretation]; Post, supra note 9, at 5-6; John Yoo, The High Court's Hamdan Power Grab, L.A. TIMES,
July 7, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-yoo7ju107,0,3547342.story?coll la-
news-comment-opinions.
12. See KECK, supra note 10, at 199-253 (delineating features of judicial activism).
13. See Service Constitution, supra note 9, at 295-302.
14. 153 CONG. REc. S831-34 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2007); S. 344, 110th Cong. (2007). The bill is identical
to S. 1768, a measure that had been introduced by Senator Arlen Specter in the fall of 2005, favorably
reported by the Judiciary Committee, and placed on the Senate's calendar in the spring of 2006. 122 CONG.
REc. S2602 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 2006) (showing S. 1768 was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Senate's calendar). See also Day to Day: Slate's Jurisprudence: U.S. Supreme
Court TV (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=5348842 [hereinafter Day to Day] (radio broadcast of interview by NPR's Madeleine
Brand of Dahlia Lithwick, discussing how Senator Specter has been sponsoring similar legislation "for
years"); Arlen Specter, Hidden Justice(s), WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2006, at A23 (discussing S. 1768 and its
necessity). Since S. 1768 and S. 344 are substantively identical, this Article will generally discuss arguments
and testimony made about the former measure as being equally pertinent to the more recent bill.
15. See 151 CONG. REC. S10426, S 10429 (2005) (text of S. 1768 read into the record).
16. See LORRAINE H. TONG, CONG. RES. SERVICE, TELEVISING SUPREME COURT AND OTHER FEDERAL
COURT PROCEEDINGS: LEGISLATION AND ISSUES 11-17 (Nov. 8 ed. 2006), available at




the Court would induce lawyers and Justices to "grandstand"' 17 before the cameras,
compromising the integrity and solemnity of the proceedings of the highest court in the
land. Television coverage of the Court would also sew popular confusion and
misunderstanding by reporting on the activities of the high bench without context and
"depth."'1 8 Supporters of televising the Court have countered that these broadcasts are
essential for keeping the public informed about the most powerful tribunal in the
world, 19 for keeping the Justices accountable, and for inducing a more robust popular
discussion about the issues facing the judiciary-and how the Court attempts to resolve
them.
21
Vetting these issues is important, and they could certainly stand for more•. 22
systematic exposition. This Article, however, pursues a different analytic tack. The
focus of this piece is whether Specter's legislation, whatever its policy merits, is
constitutional-a question that has been largely bypassed in the current debate, and has
certainly not generated a thoroughgoing investigation. The remainder of this Article
identifies a range of textual provisions, legal arguments, and legislative and judicial
precedents relevant to the question of whether the recent proposed legislation, S. 344, is
consistent with our supreme law. After briefly sketching the political and legislative
context of Specter's bill, this Article examines specific claims regarding whether
Specter's bill is either compatible with or impinges upon our Constitution's legal
commands and principles. This Article's analysis of the constitutionality of S. 344
attempts to be thorough, in the sense that it sorts through and evaluates constitutional
arguments that might be made on both sides of the debate-both by those convinced of
the constitutionality of the measure as well as those deeply skeptical. 23 This Article
17. Id. at 6, 12.
18. 1d. at 13 (discussing the "potential for misinterpretation" posed by the proposed television
legislation). See also Cameras in the Courtroom: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 109th Cong. 12 (2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1672 [hereinafter
Cameras in the Courtroom] (statement of Jan E. Dubois, Judge for the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania) (expressing concerns about how television coverage places the work of the judiciary out of
context). But cf id at 24 (testimony of Brian P. Lamb, chairman of C-SPAN) (promising that "if the Supreme
Court will ever allow its oral arguments on television, we will carry all of them from start to finish.").
19. See 151 CONG. REC. S 10426, S 10426 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2005) (statement of Senator Arlen Specter)
[hereinafter Specter] (arguing for his proposal on the grounds that "the public gets a substantial portion, if not
most, of its information from television and the internet"); Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 21-23
(testimony of Seth D. Berlin, attorney) (arguing that television coverage will improve the public's
understanding of the courts).
20. See Specter, supra note 19, at S10427 (statement of Mr. Specter) (discussing how the proposed
legislation will help to keep the Court more accountable to the public); Day to Day, supra note 14 (Court
commentator reviewing the accountability argument).
21. TONG, supra note 16, at 17 (reviewing civic education arguments).
22. Some of those engaged in policy discussions about "Supreme Court TV" appear to talk past one
another. In particular, at least some of the policy arguments against "Supreme Court TV" seem weakened in
light of the research provided and claims made by supporters of this venture. For example, a study of federal
courts' experimentation with televising judicial proceedings suggested that "the majority of jurors and
witnesses who experience electronic media coverage do not report negative consequences or concerns."
Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 21-23 (statement of Seth D. Berlin). See also TONG, supra note
16, at 18 (discussing how the purported intrusiveness of cameras in the Court could be diminished by existing
technology and resources); Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 23-25 (statement of Brian P. Lamb)
(countering the argument that Court proceedings will be televised out of context, by pledging "gavel-to-gavel
coverage of the Supreme Court").
23. To a limited degree, this Article will also consider some potential variants of S. 344, conscious that
the final measure may well be modified through the lawmaking process.
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concludes that there are compelling reasons for believing that S. 344 is indeed
constitutional, and consequently, it briefly considers the political prospects of the bill
and some of the impact the enacted measure could have on how we think about judicial
reform.
III. THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF "SUPREME COURT TV"
Televising court proceedings is not an unprecedented or even a particularly new
practice, although there is substantial variation in terms of which courts allow what
proceedings to be broadcast.24 Every state judiciary, but not the District of Columbia
Courts system, permits some televising of its proceedings, generally in both civil and
criminal courts, and at the trial as well as appellate levels.
25
At the federal level, courts and policymakers have been much more resistant to
allowing judicial proceedings to be televised. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure bars both photographing and broadcasting court proceedings in federal
criminal trials. 26 More broadly, the Judicial Conference of the United States has issued
a policy prohibiting the televising, recording, or broadcasting of the proceedings of both
civil and criminal federal trial courts. 27 The Conference has qualified this proscription,
permitting courts of appeals to allow television and other forms of coverage.
28
Currently, two circuits have used this authority to televise some of their proceedings.
Since 1955, the Supreme Court has made audio recordings of both oral argument
and Justices' reading of opinion summaries and excerpts from the high bench, but for
decades, these recordings were handed over to the National Archives and Records
Administration and only made available to the public and press through a somewhat
onerous and dilatory process.29 After the 2000 presidential election controversy, and
the attendant interest in Bush v. Gore, the Court became more accommodating to
24. Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 21-23 (statement of Seth D. Berlin) (discussing the
practices of different courts).
25. TONG, supra note 16, at 17; Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 23 (statement of Seth D.
Berlin) (discussing state practices).
26. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. The rule reads:
Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of
photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial
proceedings from the courtroom.
Id. See also infra, Part IV.B.2.b.(4) (discussing Rule 53).
27. The Judicial Conference of the United States originally adopted a resolution in 1962 opposing the
broadcasting of judicial proceedings, and it has affirmed and further specified this opposition in a number of
subsequent resolutions. See TONG, supra note 16, at 3-6 (discussing Conference policy and its effects on
federal courts). Between 1991-1994, six district and two appellate courts participated in a pilot program
examining the effectiveness and advisability of having television proceedings in federal civil courts. Id. at 4.
The Conference decided against the subsequent recommendation by the Federal Judicial Center that the
program be extended to all district courts and courts of appeals covering civil matters. Id. See also MARY
TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS,
AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN SIx DISTRICT COURTS AND Two COURTS OF APPEALS 43-45
(1994), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/elecmediacov.pdf/$flle/elecmediacov.pdf.
28. Under the current policy, the judicial council for each circuit determines whether television is
permitted within the entire circuit. TONG, supra note 16, at 4.
29. Bill Mears, Supreme Court to Provide Audio Tape of Arguments, CNN.COM, Mar. 31, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/O3/31/scotus.scotus.audio/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007); Cameras
in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 20-21 (statement of Peter Irons).
30. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
[Vol. 33:2
Supreme Court TV
public interest in its proceedings, providing direct access to some of its audio
recordings. Currently, the Court decides whether to release its audio tapes of oral
arguments and opinions on a case-by-case basis. These materials are available on the
same day they are recorded in only a handful of cases, although in October 2006, the
Court announced it would subsequently post same-day transcripts of oral arguments on
its official website.
3 1
Beginning with the 105th Congress (1997-1998), and continuing through every
subsequent Congress, federal lawmakers have introduced legislation seeking to induceS 32
more televised broadcasting of federal court proceedings. While a number of these
measures have simply sought to expand the federal courts' options related to televising
trial and appellate proceedings, other measures, like the current Specter legislation, have
required some courts to open their proceedings to live television broadcasts.
33
To date, Specter's proposal has assumed only a modest political profile. But the
measure possesses a number of qualities that should make it attractive to the current and
future Congresses.34  Prominent leaders of both parties have endorsed the bill.
35
Moreover, the proposed law is the kind of democratic and procedural reform likely to
be more broadly popular than measures seeking to alter the Court's policies or powers
directly (such as proposals to restrict what kinds of cases the Court can review).36 For a
federal lawmaker, an initiative requiring the Court to be more accessible and transparent
is easier to defend and "sell" to a wide range of constituents than, for example, a
measure seeking to alter powers of judicial review that the Court has exercised for over
200 years.
37
Finally, the recent call to televise some of the Supreme Court's proceedings may
31. Charles Lane, High Court to Post Same-Day Transcripts, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at A08; Press
Release, United States Supreme Court (Sept. 14, 2006) available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/press/pr_-09-14-06.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (discussing the Court's new same-day release
policy).
32. TONG, supra note 16, at 6.
33. Id.
34. Day to Day, supra note 14 (contending that while Senator Specter has been sponsoring legislation
"for years" calling for the Court to televise its sessions, the current initiative seems to have "traction").
35. In addition to Specter himself, who had been Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and is now the
ranking minority member of the committee, the bill's earliest supporters include Republican Chuck Grassley
(ranking member of the Finance Committee) and John Cornyn (who had been a Republican whip and was
selected to be Vice Chairman of the Senate Republican Conference in December 2006). Among Democrats,
Dick Durbin (Assistant Majority Leader), Charles Schumer (Vice Chair of the Democratic Conference and
Chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee) and Russell Feingold (Deputy Whip) were
amongst the original cosponsors of S. 344. Patrick Leahy (current Chair of the Judiciary Committee) joined
these other lawmakers in supporting S. 1768, Specter's earlier version of the television bill-a measure that
had been reported favorably to the full Senate after a 12-6 bipartisan vote from the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Cathy J. Potter, Senate Judiciary Committee Clears Bill to Allow TV Cameras in Supreme Court,
JURIST, Mar. 30, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006 03_30_indexarch.php#11437735472702
5458.
36. See JOHN R. HIBBING AND ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT
AMERICANS DISLIKE? 243 (2001) (discussing Americans' dissatisfaction with American politics and emphasis
on procedural reforms as a solution to its purported problems); Meredith McGehee, How Congress Should
Tackle its Institutional Corruption, THE HILL, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.hillnews.comi/thehill/export/
TheHill/Comment/OpEd/l I 1506.html.
37. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC




benefit from a leadership change within the Court itself.3 8 Chief Justice John Roberts,
sworn in as the nation's seventeenth Chief Justice in 2005, signaled that he would at
least consider televising Supreme Court sessions.39 As Roberts stated, "my new best
friend, Senator Thompson, assures me that television cameras are nothing to be afraid
of. But I don't have a set view on that. ' 4°  While hardly a strong endorsement of
allowing cameras in the Court, Roberts' seemingly open-minded approach on this issue
contrasts with his predecessor, William Rehnquist, and, at least according to some
commentators, presages an inevitable change in the Court's historic reluctance to
broadcast its proceedings.
4 1
IV. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S. 344
The current political environment looks fairly favorable for Specter's proposal: the
bill has supporters across the ideological spectrum and is being introduced in a
Congress that appears willing to confront the judiciary.42  Thus S. 344 may find
political daylight in the form of increased debate on and publicity surrounding the
measure, if not passage into law.43 In this context, a question that has been mostly
ignored is likely to receive greater scrutiny: Is S. 344 constitutional?
Several sitting Justices of the Supreme Court are not so sure. In the spring of 2006,
during a hearing before a House Appropriations Subcommittee, Associate Justice
Anthony Kennedy expressed deep reservations about Specter's bill on the grounds that
it was "inconsistent with the deference and etiquette that should apply between the
branches. ' 44 At the same proceeding, Associate Justice Clarence Thomas stated that
Specter's measure "runs the risk of undermining the manner in which we consider
cases." 45  Compelling the Court to televise its proceedings, Thomas chided, would
38. Dahlia Lithwick, The Letterman Justice: John Roberts is Too Savvy to Keep Cameras Out of Court
Forever, SLATE, Dec. 8, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2131895.
39. U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong., 265-266 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts).
40. Id.
41. Lithwick, supra note 38. In a 2006 appearance before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' Judicial
Conference, Chief Justice Roberts was asked if television coverage would occur first in a federal civil jury
trial or at the Supreme Court. He responded:
That's a tough question. In either case, there's a concern about the impact of television on the
functioning of the institution, both the civil trial and the Supreme Court argument ... All of the
Justices view themselves as trustees of an extremely valuable institution, one that we think by and
large functions pretty well. The oral argument is a valuable and important part of that, and we're
going to be very careful before we do anything that will have an adverse impact on that, and I
think that same perspective applies to the civil trials. I appreciate very much the argument that the
public would benefit greatly from seeing how we do things.
TONG, supra note 16, at 3.
42. Congressional Interpretation, supra note II, at 127, 132-138 (discussing recent congressional
attitudes towards congressional interpretation and the courts).
43. Tony Mauro, Bill Allowing Cameras in Supreme Court Gains Momentum, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10,
2005, at 13, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=l 131583507730
[hereinafter, Mauro, Bill Allowing Cameras] (quoting Senator Charles Schumer and other public officials who
indicate that the television legislation may be coming of age).
44. Linda Greenhouse, 2 Justices Indicate Supreme Court Is Unlikely to Televise Sessions, N.Y. TIMES,




precipitate "some conflict between the branches.
' 46
But do these rather vague warnings amount to anything? On what grounds,
specifically, might one argue that Specter's bill strays beyond, or is consistent with, the
Constitution's powers and proscriptions? The remainder of this Article attempts to
work through these legal queries in a systematic manner, leaving to others the policy
questions concerning whether televising Supreme Court sessions is an advisable course
of action. As indicated, this Article is partly impelled by a sense that specific analysis
of the constitutional issues posed by S. 344 is largely absent from the current debates
about televising the Court.4 7 The question of constitutionality could influence whether
S. 344 becomes law,48 and whether it would survive the almost inevitable legal
challenges that would arise once it became a part of the United States Code.
While the ensuing analysis includes a consideration of judicial precedent and legal
doctrine relevant to assessing the constitutionality of Specter's proposal for "Supreme
Court TV," this Article attempts to evaluate constitutional questions from a broader
perspective. There is only limited case law directly pertinent to this Article's inquiry;
consequently, the courts provide an incomplete bag of analytic tools for assessing
Specter's bill. In addition, this Article takes seriously the obligations public officials
and members of the public have to engage in their own constitutional analysis. 49 These
obligations are heightened in this context-where the courts (and especially the
Supreme Court) would assess Specter's bill from a potentially compromised and partial
institutional position, as judges involved in their own case. There are good reasons
for believing that the struggle over televising the Supreme Court will pit quite different
claims from both the legislature and judiciary about the constitutional status and
propriety of this initiative. At a minimum, this Article is designed to help sort through
these debates.
A. The Separation of Powers Objection
There are several basic arguments that raise doubts about the constitutional status
of the proposed television legislation. First, one might object that this bill would
threaten the constitutional separation of powers. Justice Kennedy's 2006 remarks
before the House Appropriations subcommittee hinted at this concern. In speaking
46. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Pushes Back on Televised Proceedings, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id= 144154023584.
47. Even one of the more thorough and recent analyses of the debates over televising the judiciary (and
the associated legislation) does not offer anything approximating a systematic analysis of the constitutional
issues pertinent to Specter's legislative proposals. TONG, supra note 16, at 13 (sketching separation of powers
arguments relevant to the Specter bill).
48. See generally, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10 (outlining the case for Congress's
responsibility to engage in independent constitutional analysis, including considering whether proposed bills
should become law).
49. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 53-57 (statement of Seth D. Berlin). See also
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231-279 (1988)
[hereinafter FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES]; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35-92 (Oxford University Press 2004).
50. See infra, Part V. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) ("No man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt




about the Specter legislation, Kennedy warned that the Justices "feel very strongly that
we have intimate knowledge of the dynamics and the mood of the [C]ourt." 51 Since the
Justices have taken the position that "[i]t's not for the [C]ourt to tell the Congress how
to conduct its proceedings," Congress should embrace a reciprocal standard and leave
the television matter to be determined by the Court. 52 "We feel very strongly," Justice
Kennedy concluded, "that this matter should be left to the courts." 53 While Kennedy's
comments were somewhat oblique, they struck at least one commentator as introducing
a "new" constitutional argument into the debate about televising the Court that
essentially stood as a warning to the legislature: "Go ahead ... enact your law, we're
going to strike it down," presumably on separation of powers grounds.
54
What are we to make of the suggestion that Specter's proposal would violate our
Constitution's separation of powers and institutions? One might initially note that it is
by no means obvious what our commitment to the separation of powers includes, either
as a descriptive or normative matter. No portion of our constitutional text deals
explicitly with the separation of powers, and there is considerable debate by scholars,
55
as well as inconsistency amongst jurists, about how we should conceptualize and
protect this constitutional arrangement. 56 While it is beyond the scope of this Article to
present a systematic argument and defense of how we should and actually do construe
the separation of powers, 57 the following section focuses on what would seem to be the
most likely objections raised against the Specter legislation on separation of powers
grounds.
1. Inappropriate blending of powers?
A widely held view is that the separation of powers is premised on dividing
institutional power as a means of preventing arbitrary exercises of authority and, in the
extreme, tyranny.58 As James Madison warned in The Federalist, the "accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
59
51. Greenhouse, supra note 44; Mauro, supra note 46.
52. Greenhouse, supra note 44.
53. Mauro, supra note 46.
54. Day to Day, supra note 14 (statement of court commentator Dahlia Lithwick). In this context, one
might also consider whether comments like Justice Kennedy's can ever amount to an impermissible advisory
opinion (a court judgment made outside of a particular case or controversy. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-63 (1911) (dismissing the case because there was no actual controversy between
the supposed adversarial parties).
55. See generally Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Towards a Unifying Theory of the Separation of
Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing different traditions of separation of powers research).
56. See id. at 12-17 (discussing jurisprudence).
57. See id. at 17-42 (providing a new, "unifying" theory of the separation ofpowers).
58. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of
the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power."); William B. Gwyn, The Separation of Powers and Modern Forms of
Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DOES IT STILL WORK? 65-66 (Robert A. Goldwin &
Art Kaufman eds., 1986) (stating that the goals of the constitutional order are to protect individual liberty and
prevent tyranny).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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However, Madison's rather restrictive "definition of tyranny" actually occurs in
the context of arguing for the necessity of blending and sharing institutional powers.
6 1
Even the most rigid readings of the Constitution's separation of powers62 accede to
Madison's observation that in the U.S. the federal departments "are by no means totally
separate and distinct from each other."63  Presidents are famously involved in
lawmaking through their power to propose legislation and issue vetoes. Similarly, our
constitutional text invites Congress to become rather intimately involved in the work of
the judiciary. To take one of the more obvious examples, Article III grants Congress a
seemingly sweeping constitutional power to make "exceptions" and "regulations" to the
Court's appellate jurisdiction.64  Moreover, a number of federal statutes provide
Congress with control over a substantial portion of the Court's business. Congress, for
example, determines the presence of clerks and the role of the Court's marshal, fixes the
Court's budget, sets the level of the Justices' salaries, and delineates the particular
penalties for those who "parade" in the Supreme Court building or on its grounds.
65
Thus, this particular version of the separation of powers objection to S. 344 seems to be
somewhat anomalous-it is based on a more rigid model of political institutions and
their governing authority than the one we actually possess.
2. Intimidation and threatened independence?
a. Legislative encroachment
Alternatively, perhaps Specter's legislation poses a separation of powers threat that
involves compromising the judiciary's independence. 66 This purported danger might
60. Id.
61. Id. at 324. As Madison indicates:
If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical
and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a
single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and
distinct.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 722 (1986) (discussing the Constitution's creation of the presidency as "a separate and wholly
independent Executive Branch").
63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). The authors of The Federalist, and many of their
contemporaries specifically rejected the strict divisions of governing authority found in state constitutions as
mere "parchment barriers." THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
64. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2.
65. 40 U.S.C. §§ 6135, 6137 (2000).
66. There are few cases holding Congress impermissibly encroached on the judicial power, and these are
not especially helpful in resolving the questions posed by this Article. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the
Court ruled that the separation of powers barred Congress from requiring federal courts to reopen final
judgments in private civil actions. 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). In essence, Plaut held that Congress's efforts
impinged upon the judiciary's authority "to say what the law is." Id. at 218. It is not clear how the Specter
television legislation would directly threaten this power or involve the Plaut precedent. In United States v.
Brainer, the Fourth Circuit upheld the Speedy Trial Act of 1972, finding that the Act provided "no 'rules of
decision,' but only rules of practice and procedure." 691 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Smith, 899 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that executive branch investigations of court
personnel pursuant to standard procedures do not violate the separation of powers). These cases reinforce a
picture of shared separated powers, and underscore the presumed propriety of Congress imposing
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assume several forms. First, legislative intimidation and encroachment could trigger
threats to judicial independence; the passage of S. 344 could sanction and invite a more
general manipulation of the Court and its proceedings by Congress.
In the context of the numerous and uncontroversial congressional regulations
discussed above (involving, for example, the creation and direction of the Court's
budget, facilities, personnel, and internal procedures), requiring the Court to televise
conversations and debates that it already makes available to the public would hardly
seem like a greater threat to its capacity for independent judgment, or a dramatic
departure from what presidential scholar Richard Neustadt famously called "separated
institutions sharing powers." 67 Absent some other dynamics or threats, it is not entirely
obvious how "Supreme Court TV," would compromise the Court's autonomy, more
than, for example, the practice of asking the Justices to appear before Congress to
justify their annual budget. Indeed, televising the Court seems to be a regulation of the
same order as the numerous other controls that the legislature already employs.
One might make the claim that these other regulations, unlike "Supreme Court
TV," advance or facilitate the unique work of the Court and thereby promote rather than
threaten its independence as well as its powers under Article III of the Constitution.
Setting aside the question of whether televising the Court might actually promote its
authority, we might note that some of the accepted congressional regulations already in
place cannot be readily characterized as solely facilitating the judiciary's work and
independence. To return to an example, observers have not always perceived
Congress's control of the Court's budget as strictly enhancing judicial authority.
Indeed, Chief Justice John Roberts recently lamented that Congress's decision not to
increase the salaries of federal judges was threatening judicial independence and "has
now reached the level of a constitutional crisis."
68
b. General political encroachment
There is a second way in which one might conceivably argue that Specter's
legislation poses an unconstitutional threat to judicial independence. The introduction of
"Supreme Court TV" could arguably impede the Court's autonomy by inviting in, and
making the Court more conscious of, various political interests that would now be more
responsive to the high bench's day-to-day proceedings. In other words, televising the
Supreme Court could place the institution more squarely in the crosshairs of public
opinion and organized interest-group politics.
Even if the Court assumed a substantially heightened political profile as a result of
television coverage, would this development really intimidate Justices (and the lawyers
appearing before them) and somehow diminish their ability to speak freely or otherwise
administrative rules on the Court, but not regulations that compel the judiciary to reach particular decisions or
foreclose its ability to render judgments.
67. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 33 (1960).
68. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at
A 14. To take another example, Congress has not always adjusted the number of Justices who serve on the
Court solely with an eye on enhancing their power. See generally, Barry Friedman, Reconstruction's Political
Court: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two, 91 GEO. L. J. 333 (2002) (examining "the
political forces that determine the judiciary's independence from majoritarian politics-and, thus, its freedom
to engage in judicial review" especially during the era of Reconstruction).
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act independently? While some Justices are, for whatever reasons, reluctant to speak
during oral argument, and appear less comfortable with publicity than others, it is not
evident that this dynamic would change dramatically in the face of "Supreme Court
TV." The current Court is actively covered by the press, is the object of impassioned
public protests outside its building, and receives a variety of entreaties through the
amicus process and through less formal means.69 The Court's personnel are surely not
unaware of their importance and would not be surprised to hear that their arguments and
decisions are closely followed.
70
In addition, objecting to greater public exposure to the Court through televised
proceedings seems to be anti-democratic-without giving support to any obvious
countervailing value. Interest-groups and elites currently have some access to the
Court's public proceedings and to individual Justices. Legislation like S. 344 would
make exposure to the Court more universally available, arguably diminishing the role
and influence of the relatively limited group that now regularly observes and comments
upon the Court's proceedings.
71
Moreover, even some skeptics of televising the Supreme Court have dismissed the
"political encroachment" argument by drawing, in part, on the experiences of the state
and federal courts, and noting the continued independence of these entities even in the
face of greater media coverage. 72 Finally, one might contend that whatever potential
intimidation the Court could possibly face through S. 344 is necessarily limited as
Specter's bill only televises those proceedings the Court has already chosen to open to
the public.73 Internal hearings, debates, and decisions would remain closed--covering
the eyes of the public with a restrictive blinder of the Justices' own making. 
74
3. Compromising distinctive judicial functions?
A variant of these constitutional objections might be based on the assertion that
mandating television coverage of the Court would compromise or undermine distinctive
judicial functions, perspectives, or powers specified or implied in Article III or other
portions of the Constitution. Some scholars and jurists have suggested that besides
preventing the tyranny of institutions accumulating too much power or encroaching
upon one another, our separation of powers system promotes "positive" traits and
69. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
70. Indeed, one could make the case that televising the Court would reduce some of the mystery
surrounding the institution, and thereby reduce the speculation and intrigue that often surrounds popular and
press coverage of the high bench.
71. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 4 (2006) [hereinafter BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES] (discussing judges' interest in
currying the "regard of salient audiences" including particular "policy groups" and other elites).
72. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 10-12 (statement of the Hon. Diarmuid
O'Scannlain) (denying that cameras facilitate political influence on the courts); Day to Day, supra note 14
(stating opinion that "we know that cameras in courtrooms are not a problem; an awful lot of state courts use
them all the time without ill effect").
73. 153 CONG. REC. S831-34 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2007); S. 344, 110th Cong. (2007).
74. There are good reasons for thinking that oral argument is not the most important (or even a decisive)
part of the Court's decision-making process. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 111-160
(CQ Press ed., 2004); KEVIN T. McGUIRE, UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT: CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES 91-137 (McGraw Hill ed., 2001).
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features, such as the energy, unity, and secrecy associated with the presidency, 75 and the
final judgment and stability sometimes linked to courts. 76 To the extent we accept and
value these potential contributions of our separated powers, we ought to take seriously
the charge that televising the Court could somehow compromise the unique institutional
benefits it confers on our legal and political order. Some critics of the television
proposal have made arguments that hint at this objection. As federal district court
Judge Jan DuBois commented in hearings before Congress, "the camera is likely to do
more than report the proceeding-it is likely to influence the substance of the
proceeding."
77
Many of the objections that have been made along these lines, however, focus on
the supposedly disruptive effects of cameras in the context of trial proceedings. 78 For
example, when the Judicial Conference rejected recommendations that it should
generally allow television cameras throughout the federal courts, it cited concerns about
how this coverage might intimidate the parties to a case, along with witnesses and
jurors.
7 9
The Supreme Court is essentially an appellate court, so many of these concerns
about trial coverage would simply not apply. However, we might still worry that live
cameras in the Court would change the behavior of the Justices and the lawyers
appearing before them in such a way that their inclusion might unconstitutionally
diminish the Court's contribution to both our system of laws and politics-impeding,
for example, the Court's ability to resolve cases and controversies. 8 1 This argument
seems fairly unconvincing. As noted, the lawyers and Justices who engage in the
Court's open proceedings are already aware that they are under sustained and exacting
scrutiny by a national audience. 82  It is unclear why the presence of live television
75. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
76. See Frederick Schauer & Larry Alexander, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST.
COMM. 455 (2001) (linking the courts with legal stability and authoritative settlement); Peabody & Nugent,
supra note 55 at 23-24 ("we believe that another signature feature of the constitutional separation of powers is
its tendency to foster special qualities associated with good governance, such as deliberation, energy, steady
administration, and judgment-qualities linked with individual departments and needed to secure their
different governmental objectives").
77. Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 12-14 (statement of Judge Jan E. DuBois).
78. Id. (discussing concerns that the presence of cameras during judicial proceedings might be
unpredictable, and, therefore, both disruptive and prejudicial).
79. TONG, supra note 16, at 11; TREADWAY JOHNSON & KRAFKA, supra note 27, at 14 (reporting that
46% of surveyed judges indicated that the presence of television cameras made witnesses less willing to
appear, with 41% indicating that the cameras distracted witnesses). See also Executive Business Meeting:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, May 22, 2003, http://judiciary.senate.gov/
memberstatement.cfm?id=774&witid=51 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch) ("Cameras and electronic
media in the courtroom can have an intimidating effect on litigants, witnesses and jurors that negatively
impacts the trial process.").
80. In a handful of cases, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction and can act as a kind of trial court.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
81. Judge Edward R. Becker, former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, has
voiced this concern, worrying that judges might alter their approach to questioning when faced with cameras,
which, in turn, could somehow alter their decisions. TONG, supra note 16, at 12-13, 15. Again, one should
note that the claim that Justices and lawyers would alter their behavior before the cameras might take at least
two divergent forms-they could be intimidated, or, quite the opposite, they could engage in "grandstanding"
or "showboating." See, e.g., idat 12.
82. Recent scholarship, for example, has examined the extent to which the Justices contribute to oral
argument, the nature of the terms they use, and even the frequency (and effectiveness) of the humor they
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cameras would change this dynamic substantially. 83 Moreover, even if the Justices and
attorneys did somehow "play to the cameras" or otherwise change their debate and
behavior style, it is difficult to conceive how this would amount to an unconstitutional
undermining of the Court's specific institutional roles or its contribution to protecting
values such as legal stability. Regardless of participants' performance before the
cameras, the Court would still be issuing decisions, declaring winners and losers, and
helping to establish policy for the judicial system of the United States.
B. The Enumerated Powers Objection
Setting aside the various separation of powers objections still leaves us with
another broad challenge to Specter's proposed law. A basic, albeit inconsistently
applied, tenet of American constitutionalism is that every federal law is supposed to be
traceable to some specific or implied constitutional grant. 84  In the words of the
Supreme Court, Congress may only legislate or otherwise act when "authorized by one
of the powers delegated . . . in . . . the Constitution."85  So what exactly, is the
constitutional basis for mandating "Supreme Court TV?"
1. The power of the purse
Various provisions in Article I of the United States Constitution have been
construed-by the courts as well as the legislature itself-as establishing the power of
Congress to exercise wide discretion in how it raises and spends funds, so long as these
expenditures are pursuant to valid, constitutional objects. 86 Congressional practices and
precedent have largely created the particulars of authorization and appropriations, since
the Constitution says nothing about these processes and is short on budgeting details
generally.
87
If one assumes that Congress's general power to authorize and appropriate funds
for operating the Supreme Court is not controversial, could the legislature also use its
budgeting powers to impose conditions on how the Court operates? In other words, so
long as Congress did not interfere with Article III, which guarantees the Justices "a
[c]ompensation, which shall not be diminished during their [c]ontinuance in [o]ffice,"
88
could the legislature use its control over the Court's funding as a coercive tool to induce
employ. See, e.g., Jay Wexler, Laugh Track, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 59, 59-61 (2005).
83. But cf Press Release, C-SPAN.org, New C-Span Study: Congressional Scholars Examine House
Television After Twenty-Five Years (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.c-span.org/C-SPAN25/survey-release.asp
[hereinafter C-SPAN] (citing the mixed views of scholars about the effects of C-SPAN on congressional
behavior).
84. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing against the necessity of a Bill of Rights
on the grounds that the federal government only contained enumerated powers); PAUL BREST & SANFORD
LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 5 (Richard A. Epstein, ed., Aspen Law
Publishers 1992) (1975) (discussing the debate over enumerated powers).
85. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
457 (1991).
86. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 47
(Congressional Quarterly Press 2007). The Constitution, primarily through Article 1, sections 7 and 8, gives
Congress wide powers over raising revenue and considerable discretion in spending. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 47.
88. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
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the Court to agree to "Supreme Court TV"?
89
The Court's prior jurisprudence seems to suggest that the answer to this question
would depend upon whether the Specter legislation is otherwise constitutional. In South
Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that Congress has wide leeway to use its spending
powers to attach conditions to entities receiving funding, so long as these controls
satisfy a four-part test. According to the Court, conditional exercises of the spending
power must be 1) for the "general welfare" of the United States, 2) unambiguous,
providing a clear choice about the consequences of accepting the funding, 3) germane to
the overall purposes of the funding, and 4) consistent with the Constitution.
9 1
In light of Dole (and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause), we can safely conclude
that Congress could not require the Court to televise its proceedings through its budget
powers unless the Constitution otherwise permitted it to do so. Seeking to compel the
Supreme Court to televise its proceedings through the power of the purse would, as
suggested, also raise questions about whether this approach violated the guarantees of
Article III, which precludes diminishing the "compensation" of judges while they are in
office.
92
2. Art. I, Section 8
In addition to authorizing aspects of the congressional spending power, Article I,
section 8 includes a list of other sources of legislative power. Is there anything here that
authorizes Congress to put cameras in the courtroom? While these constitutional
provisions say very little about Congress's powers vis-a-vis the Supreme Court, two
items on this laundry list of powers are pertinent to this discussion.
a. Authority over the District
Among other powers delegated to Congress, Article I states that the legislature
shall:
exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the
Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,
and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
89. While S. 344 is not based on this budgetary coercion approach, it might still be modified through the
legislative process, or it could be reborn in a somewhat different form during a future Congress.
90. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-208, 211-212 (1987). Arguably, this case is not strictly
pertinent, since it involved Congress's efforts to use the spending power to control states as opposed to
another, coordinate branch of the federal government. Id. at 205.
91. Id. at 207. See also McGUIRE supra note 74, at 55-90 (discussing the Dole case); Todd D. Peterson,
Controlling the Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 993, 1014 (1998)
(citing 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 61 (1933)) ("Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations,
provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the Constitution.").
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
93
Despite its somewhat sweeping language, this provision does not grant Congress a
general authority to provide legislative regulation of anything in the District. Such a
reading would give the legislature a rather blanket power over the Court and much of
the executive branch-in a way that is in obvious tension with other aspects of the
Constitution.
However, Congress has employed this constitutional provision to regulate and
protect federal property in the District of Columbia, passing laws that provide for the
maintenance, care, operation, and security of the Supreme Court building and its
grounds.94 Could proposals to televise the Supreme Court be constitutionally justified
on this basis-claiming that televising the Court was incident to Congress's authority
over the District and its grounds and buildings?
Congress is empowered to pass legislation related to the District and its
governance, and to regulate other federal buildings and places within the District. But,
presumably, Congress's authority over the non-District federal property limits it to
governing the property per se, rather than using these controls as a more general
regulatory power. Specter's legislation does not, for example, seek to install cameras
on the Court grounds as a means of promoting security. Instead, it appears to regulate
more directly the judicial power itself. Understood in this way, the connection between
the legislature's constitutional grant over the District and its property, and the manner in
which S. 344 requires television cameras in the Court, is arguably too remote to serve as
the legal basis for the proposed law.
b. The Necessary and Proper Clause
Article I, section 8 concludes with the so-called "elastic clause," which gives
Congress authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" powers given to the federal government. 95  Does the
"necessary and proper" clause provide Congress with the legal power to mandate
televising the Supreme Court? Could one insist, for example, that televising Supreme
Court proceedings is "necessary and proper" to furthering the "judicial power," which
Article III vests in the Court?
The Court's own jurisprudence certainly gives proponents of "Supreme Court TV"
a basis for pursuing this claim. The Court has given Congress considerable leeway to
enact legislation pursuant to the "necessary and proper" clause, merely requiring a
"rational nexus" between "the content of a specific power in Congress and the action of
Congress in carrying that power into execution." 96  In the famous (if somewhat
elliptical) words of McCulloch v. Maryland, so long as the legislative end is
"legitimate" and "within the scope of the Constitution ... [then] all means which are
93. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
94. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. To be more precise, the necessary and proper clause allows Congress to
advance both the specific legislative powers granted to Congress by Article 1, Section 8, as well as "all other
powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United States." Id.
96. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958).
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appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
' 97
More specifically, the Court has sanctioned, and Congress has energetically
utilized, a broad legal authority to fashion rules governing the operations of the federal
courts. As the Court indicated in Wiley v. Coastal Corp.:
[f]rom almost the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that
Congress, acting pursuant to its authority to make all laws "necessary and proper" to
[the] establishment [of federal courts], also may enact laws regulating the conduct of
those courts and the means by which their judgments are enforced.
98
(1) Legislative enhancements
What, precisely, does this power entail with respect to Congress's supervision of
the Supreme Court? There are several ways of understanding the necessary and proper
clause-and consequently, its purposes and limits-in the context of this Article. First,
the clause could be understood as permitting federal legislation if it somehow
"enhances" valid powers of national government. 99 This reading of the clause would
presumably justify Specter's bill if it promoted, for example, the operations and
effectiveness of the Court, by furthering the administration of justice and the Court's
responsibilities as outlined in Article III. A classic example of this sort of "necessary
and proper" legislation would be the Act that created the Federal Judicial Center in
1967 "to promote improvements in judicial administration in the courts of the United
States."
100
Justifying S. 344 on the grounds that it is a "necessary" enhancement or extension
of the Court's powers is not obvious at first glance. 10 1 While there is some research
suggesting that televising federal and state court proceedings has beneficial effects in
terms of conferring legitimacy on the judiciary, the necessity of the technology is
certainly debatable. 102  Could providing more coverage of the Court through the
97. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
98. Wiley v. Coastal Corporation, 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1991). See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
99. See discussion supra note 66 and accompanying text (whether the separation of powers permits only
legislation that enhances or facilitates judicial power).
100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629 (2000). The Federal Judicial Center is the education and research agency for
the federal courts created by Congress to improve judicial administration of the U.S. courts. See Federal
Judicial Center Home Page, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
101. Strictly adhering to only an "enhancement" view of the necessary and proper clause is certainly
inconsistent with our constitutional history and past institutional practices. If Congress were to reduce the
number of Justices (as it has done previously) or increase the categories of cases the Court must hear on
appeal, these changes would not obviously enhance the powers of the Court, even though they seem to be
constitutional.
102. See, e.g., RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV: TELEVISION, JUSTICE, AND THE COURTS 96-98
(1998) (reviewing scholarship on the effects of televising different judicial proceedings and contexts);
Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 21-23 (statement of Seth D. Berlin) (discussing the federal
courts' three-year pilot program and its findings that overall "attitudes of judges toward electronic media
coverage of civil proceedings were initially neutral and became more favorable after experience under the
pilot program"); id. at 25-27 (statement of Henry S. Schleifl). But cf C-SPAN, supra note 83.
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medium of television deepen the public's understanding and knowledge of the high
bench, in a way that makes it operate more effectively? Could "Supreme Court TV"
increase the accountability of the Court, thereby enhancing its connection to the people
and, in turn, its capacity to carry out its duties? 10 3 While it is conceivable that both
questions could be answered in the affirmative, these are still somewhat questionable
bases for constitutionally grounding Specter's television proposal. It is possible that
televising the Court could have no effect, or even a negative effect, upon the Court's
legitimacy and effectiveness. Certainly, as already indicated, a number of judges and
Justices are themselves skeptical about the positive correlation between televised
proceedings and the Court's ability to conduct its business. Presumably their views
carry considerable weight in trying to establish whether television would be necessary
for enhancing the Court's work. More broadly, arguing that S. 344 is strictly necessary
for advancing the Court's functions and operations appears to push the limits of how we
normally understand "necessity." After all, the Supreme Court's ability to function
does not seem to have been obviously compromised by its historical absence from the
nation's television screens.
On the other hand, if we adopt a less rigid conception of congressional authority
under the necessary and proper clause, three alternate arguments provide a basis for
claiming that S. 344 does indeed constitutionally advance or enhance the judicial power
of the Supreme Court, and is therefore a defensible exercise of Congress's powers under
Article I, section 8. First, we might note that the Court itself promotes a kind of
heuristic function in opening its oral arguments to the public, and in choosing to read
summaries and sometimes excerpts from its opinions (including dissents). If one
presumes that these initiatives are defensible exercises of the judicial power, it seems
entirely plausible that the proposed television bill would enhance their educational
value by potentially reaching millions of viewers rather than the small group that
currently attends the Court in person. Second, a proposal requiring the Supreme Court
to televise its proceedings might facilitate the Court's distinctive institutional role,
especially its capacity to contribute to legal and political stability and unity.10 4 To the
extent the Court can promote this legal "settlement" by communicating with the general
public, televised proceedings will surely advance this function. Third, as discussed in
the following section, Congress seems to possess implicit rulemaking powers over
federal government; this authority may empower Congress to pass specific regulations
that do not themselves advance the judicial power, but occur in an area of institutional
operations in which it is critical to have some rule established for judicial operations.
Thus, while we know that it is not strictly "necessary and proper" for the Court to have
a membership of nine (it has operated with fewer and more Justices), it seems plausible
to argue that it must have some fixed membership level to perform. The television
legislation, then, may be understood as advancing the judicial power by providing
specific regulation within a broad area-access to the Court-that is genuinely
103. As discussed infra Part V, these arguments are among the central justifications Senator Specter
himself has made on behalf of his bill. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. S1259 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2007) (quoting
Justice Felix Frankfurter's statement that "[i]f the news media would cover the Supreme Court as thoroughly
as it did the World Series, it would be very important since 'public confidence in the judiciary hinges on the
public perception of it."').
104. See Schauer & Alexander, supra note 76, at 455.
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"necessary" for its functioning.
Alternatively, we might argue that S. 344 is necessary and proper for enhancing
federal powers and functions found in another branch or, more generally, "in the
government of the United States." 10 5  For example, even if one concludes that
"Supreme Court TV" has no effect upon the ability of the Court to fulfill its functions, it
might still be defended as promoting Congress's oversight powers or in keeping the
public informed about their leaders and institutions. 106  Given the bill's focus on
proceedings that the Court has itself chosen to make public, this argument is not entirely
straightforward. While we will look at this question in greater detail below, the Specter
bill appears to be so closely tethered to existing judicial operations that it may be
difficult to justify solely on the grounds that it advances some non-judicial power or
prerogative found in the Constitution. 
107
(2) Legislative rulemaking
As indicated, we can also frame the question of whether the legislature retains the
"necessary and proper" authority to force cameras into the Supreme Court in a quite
different manner. Adopting a "legislative rulemaking" approach to the necessary and
proper clause allows us to move beyond understanding the provision as strictly limited
to enhancing the powers of the various institutions and entities of national government.
We might ask instead, whether Congress can use its necessary and proper power to fill
in the details governing aspects of the judicial power, including even the judiciary's
ability to govern itself.
As already suggested, Congress has certainly provided this regulation in other
contexts. For almost one hundred years, for example, Congress has handed the Court
its calendar, compelling it, under the United States Code, to open every new term on the
first Monday in October. 108 No one would pretend that it is necessary and proper for
the Supreme Court to start its business on this particular date-almost any starting time
would do.109  However, it is arguably essential that the Court's term have some
beginning, so that those seeking rulings from the Court know how to prepare their case,
and have a sense of when they might anticipate a ruling.
In this, as well as in other aspects of public life, we have a long tradition of
allowing Congress, as the federal government's chief policymaking body, to set out
particular rules in order to make the work of our national institutions possible. In
105. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
106. While the Constitution does not provide an explicit constitutional grant empowering Congress to
promote the public's scrutiny of governmental procedures and products, such authority is arguably implicit in
certain constitutional provisions (such as the First Amendment) and in our general conception of republican
governance. This implied power would seem to justify other important legislation such as, for example, the
Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552 (2007).
107. Moreover, this argument raises other problems. One might note that the "enhancing" interpretation
of the necessary and proper clause is necessarily limited because there are situations where promoting one set
of government powers or processes arguably comes at the expense of another. In addition, it is not entirely
clear how we ought to resolve conflicts between (and within) institutions about the perceived "necessity" of
different legislative proposals.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
109. Similarly, we can't argue that starting the Court's session on this date enhances its work-at least not
relative to many other starting dates.
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addition to stipulating precisely when the Court's term begins, for example, the United
States Code establishes how many Justices sit on the Court and what constitutes a Court
quorum for conducting business. 
1 10
Presumably, Congress's power to pass these regulations does not flow directly
from its own legislative responsibilities and functions. Instead, Congress enacts these
measures as a function of its constitutional authority to enact laws that are "necessary
and proper" for advancing some of the "powers vested by this Constitution [more
generally] in the government of the United States" and specifically, the judiciary. III
Evaluated against this background of Congress's rather extensive history of "filling
in" the details of judicial power, the constitutional grounding of S. 344 looks fairly112
secure. The Specter television legislation would provide specific guidelines for
exercising an implicit Article III power that, on its own, has been free of controversy-
the Court's authority to open some of its proceedings to the public, a practice that the
Court now follows in permitting private citizens to hear and view oral argument and
other aspects of its proceedings.
113
One might still argue that, unlike other aspects of the judiciary regulated by
Congress, the power that the Specter legislation aims to govern is not somehow
"obligatory." In other words, we might conclude that the Constitution allows for
legislative rulemaking under the "necessary and proper" clause, but only in areas that
are strictly "necessary" for the Court's operation. The Court must have some number of
Justices, needs to have a quorum to operate, and depends upon a budget of some size to
facilitate its work. Existing legislation, such as the Judiciary Act of 1789, 114 fills in the
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1. As Senator Specter argued in introducing S. 1768:
While the Constitution specifically creates the Supreme Court, it left it to Congress to determine
how the Court would operate. For example, it was Congress that fixed the number of Justices on
the Supreme Court at nine. Likewise, it was Congress that decided that any six of these Justices
are sufficient to constitute a quorum of the Court. It was Congress that decided that the term of the
Court shall commence on the first Monday in October of each year, and it was Congress that
determined the procedures to be followed whenever the Chief Justice is unable to perform the
duties of his office.
Specter, supra note 19, at S 10429 (statement of Mr. Specter).
111. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
112. It is worth noting in this context that the Constitution only specifies that each house of Congress will
determine its own rules and internal procedures:
Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and
a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn
from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such
manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide. Each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two thirds, expel a member.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. There is no comparable language for either the judiciary or executive branch, and, of
course, by practice, the structure and operations of both of these branches are largely created and controlled
by congressional laws.
113. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 96 (statement of Peter Irons) (discussing the
Court's increasing willingness to make itself available to the public, including its occasional release of
"audio-tapes ... on the [same] day of the arguments").
114. Among other regulations, the Judiciary Act of 1789 set down guidelines for the size of the overall
Court, for the Court's quorum operations, the location of Court sessions, the minimum number of sessions it
could hold each year, and indicated that "precedence" amongst the Justices was to be established by their
length of tenure. I STAT. 73, § 1. Supporters of S. 1768 might point to the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a widely
accepted, longstanding law that allows for rather detailed superintending of the Court's internal functions.
Opponents of the Specter bill might claim that unlike S. 344, the Judiciary Act was foundational-setting out
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details of essential aspects of the Court's business, supporting vital elements of its basic
operations. But S. 344, in this view, is not of such a character. Determining whether to
televise the Court's proceedings is not the kind of foundational question that must be
decided as a prerequisite for enabling the Court to fulfill its core responsibilities.
But this demanding standard would call into question much of the legislation, and
with it many of the practices, that the Court has long depended upon, and the nation has
come to accept. To name just a few examples, if the necessary and proper clause were
construed as only allowing congressional regulations of measures that must be enacted
for the Court to perform, the presence of law clerks, the Public Information Office, and
the Federal Judicial Center would all be brought into serious question. 115  Such a
reading seems needlessly restrictive.
(3) Procedural vs. substantive regulations
We might add an additional layer to this analysis of the necessary and proper clause
and its relevance to assessing the constitutionality of S. 344. Some court decisions have
attempted to distinguish procedural regulations of the judiciary made in the name of the
necessary and proper clause (permissible) from substantive regulations (impermissible).
For example, in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, the Court ruled that "Article III
of the Constitution, augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause ...empowers
Congress to establish a system of federal district and appellate courts and, impliedly, to
establish procedural Rules governing litigation in these courts."
' 116
While this distinction is difficult to delineate, it is not meaningless. A proposal that
sought to bar the Court from reviewing cases related solely to abortion on the groundsS 117
that these decisions damaged the Court's legitimacy and effectiveness would seem to
aim at a rather specific substantive goal rather than enacting a neutral, procedural rule
for the Court to follow; this sort of proposal targets what the Court decides rather than
seeking to govern the manner or environment in which it makes its decisions.
Setting aside the question of whether this emphasis on procedure over substance is
a sensible construction of the "necessary and proper" clause, should we regard the
rules strictly "necessary" for the operations of the court-and entirely procedural, not attempting to impact the
substantive decisionmaking of the Court. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50
DUKE L. J. 1215, 1223 n.22 (2001) (arguing that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was a "super-statute" or
"foundational statute" of a different class than ordinary legislation).
115. Presumably, one might respond to these arguments by claiming that the best interpretation of the
necessary and proper clause would only permit legislative regulations of the courts (and presumably other
bodies) if they were either I) strictly necessary for the operation of the judiciary, or 2) if they somehow
enhanced that institution. But again, while this would cover much of existing regulative legislation and
rulemaking, it would leave other crucial statutes behind. To take just one example, it is not at all obvious that
this test would permit the creation of the Freedom of Information Act-at least not through the necessary and
proper clause. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
116. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987). Cf Budinich v. Becton Dickinson &
Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)) ("[e]nactments
'rationally capable of classification' as procedural rules are necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the power to establish federal courts vested in Congress by Article Ill, Section 1"). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2000) (The Rules Enabling Act, authorizing the Supreme Court to "prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence" for the federal courts).
117. This specific measure might also be pursued through Congress's Article Ill power to control the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court. See generally Service Constitution, supra note 9.
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Specter legislation as largely procedural or substantive?'11 On its face, the bill seems to
be the former-seeking not to shape or direct the Court to particular outcomes but
controlling the medium through which the Court publicizes its work.
(4) Fed. R. Crim. P. 53
Of existing regulations and laws, the one most pertinent to this discussion and
analysis of S. 344 is Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 119 The United
States Supreme Court, pursuant to federal law, promulgates and changes the Federal
Rules, subject to Congress's approval and amendment. 12  Rule 53 bars both
photographing and broadcasting court proceedings in federal criminal trials.
12 1
Assuming this rule is a valid exercise of congressional power, partly delegated to the
Supreme Court, 122 does the rule either cast doubt upon or enhance the constitutional
case for S. 344? As indicated, Congress created the Court's authority to fashion federal
rules, and that authority is subject to congressional specification and correction.
Passing S. 344 would effectively amend Rule 53 with respect to the Court; the old
federal Rule would not have trumping power over the newly enacted federal law.
Therefore, Rule 53 does not pose an obstacle to Specter's initiative.
Does the Rule somehow authorize the television bill? In other words, can we argue
that Congress's delegated power to enact Rule 53-barring television from the federal
criminal courts-implies the inverse authority to enact "Supreme Court TV?" In a
sense, the question largely reprises the prior "necessary and proper" analysis and is,
therefore, of secondary importance to that discussion. If one construes exercises of the
"elastic clause" narrowly, 123 as allowing only enhancements of judicial power or
operations that directly further the work of the courts, then one might conclude,
especially given the federal judiciary's own resistance to televised proceedings, that the
118. The Court's Plumer ruling argued not only that it was, at times, difficult to maintain the substantive-
procedural distinction, and that where the question was ambiguous, the Court should err on the side of
accepting the regulation:
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper
Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in
those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
120. See http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/l O9th/crim2OO5.pdf.
121. Specifically the rule states, "Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must
not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of
judicial proceedings from the courtroom." FED. R. CRIM. P. 53. Although Rule 53 does not explicitly bar
television broadcasts, it has been generally interpreted as including this prohibition. See United States v.
Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1279 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1988).
122. To date, courts have generally rejected constitutional challenges to Rule 53. See, e.g., Hastings, 695
F.2d at 1279; Conway v. United States, 852 F.2d 187, 188 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Moussaoui, 205
F.R.D. 183, 186 (E.D. Va. 2002) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Rule 53 and rejecting a motion to
record and televise the pretrial and trial proceedings of defendant). Interestingly, the court in Moussaoui also
indicated that the question of televising was ultimately "a question of social and political policy best left to the
United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States." Moussaoui, 205 F.R.D. at 186.
123. As discussed, a broader construction would view the necessary and proper clause as carving out
broad zones of legislative action wherein Congress might enact regulations that are themselves somewhat
unrelated or have a neutral relationship to the goal of advancing the work of the courts.
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constitutional authority behind Rule 53 goes only "one way,"'124 allowing for the
exclusion of cameras but not authorizing their presence. Alternatively, as argued
previously, there are grounds for believing that televised proceedings could advance the
judicial power, and the history of congressional regulations of the courts suggests that
Congress has a general authority to enact laws that fill in the details within fairly broad
areas of governance. While, on its own, Rule 53 does not establish the constitutional
propriety of "Supreme Court TV," it certainly does not damage the case.
(5) Summary
We might summarize the forgoing analysis of the necessary and proper clause by
concluding that the Specter legislation has a secure constitutional foundation through
this textual provision. Specifically, the bill arguably advances the Court's judicial
power directly in several ways (by, for example, supporting its settlement function and
by making the proceedings it has chosen to reveal to the public more widely available).
Moreover, S. 344 represents a valid exercise of Congress's authority to enact rules that
fill in the details of how the public gains access to and information about the Court-in
a manner that does not erode the Court's independence, particularly not relative to other• . 125
broadly accepted regulations. Finally, we have some initial reasons for thinking that
the Specter legislation would validly advance non-judicial powers and general
governmental interests-especially the authority of Congress and the general public to
monitor the work of the judiciary.
3. Article III congressional controls
Article III specifies a finite number of cases in which the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction and states that in "all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions,
and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." 126 The Specter legislation
under consideration does not limit itself to promoting coverage of cases considered
under the Court's appellate authority; it televises all "open sessions" of the Court,
although in practice these sessions would overwhelmingly involve appellate matters.
Could this seemingly broad grant of power under Article III provide a basis for a variant
of the Specter bill, perhaps a measure that sought to televise sessions of the Court
involving the cases it reviews through its appellate jurisdiction?
The question is complex and beyond the scope of this study, which is focused on
the language and constitutional basis for Specter's original bill, S. 344. The Article III
power has been used as the basis for a range of legislation, including bills that set the
124. Some support for this construal of the Rules themselves can perhaps be found in Federal Rule 2,
which explains that the rules "are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal
proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable
expense and delay." FED. R. CIM. P. 2.
125. Not every regulation would meet this test. A bill that sought to increase the size of the Supreme
Court significantly might well threaten its institutional responsibility for providing stability and clarity to the
law.
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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dollar threshold for diversity jurisdiction in civil matters 127 and, more controversially,
laws that have "stripped" the Court of authority to hear particular classes of cases.
128
Legislation seeking to use Article III as the basis for controlling the means through
which the Court publicizes its actions would seem to be of a different class than these
historical exercises of the power, but, again, the issue would require more thorough and
systematic analysis.
4. The First Amendment and rights of access
Does the First Amendment include a right of public access that authorizes
mandatory television legislation? While the amendment says nothing explicitly about a
general right to view judicial proceedings, longstanding practices and more recent court
decisions have permitted private citizens to attend many criminal proceedings. 129 Some
federal circuits and state courts have extended this guarantee to civil trials. 130 This
history, along with the rationale of allowing the public to inspect the operations of
courts to help maintain the integrity of the judicial process, creates a "strong
presumption of access to judicial proceedings and court records."
' 13 1
However, it is not obvious this right to access includes appellate matters and, more
to the point, "courts generally have been hesitant to find that the First Amendment
requires camera access."' 132 Some proponents of televising judicial proceedings have
argued that denying this coverage impermissibly favors one form of news media (print)
over another (television)-encroaching upon the First Amendment's press
protections. 133 While the First Amendment would seem to require access on the same
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (codification of the amount in controversy dollar threshold needed for
federal diversity jurisdiction).
128. Service Constitution, supra note 9, at 289-93, 302-03 (discussing successful efforts by Congress to
pass "subject matter jurisdiction" controls of the Court).
129. See, e.g., Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in
the court room is public property . . . [t]here is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as
distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which
transpire in proceedings before it."); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 580 (1980) (First
Amendment includes right to attend criminal trials); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
603 (1982) (invalidating automatic closure of courts during testimony of minor victims involved in sexual
offense cases); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984) (right of access includes voir
dire hearings); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (access to preliminary hearings
protected by First Amendment).
130. See, e.g., Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984) (First Amendment
guarantees public and press access to civil proceedings); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles Cty., 980 P.2d 337, 361 (Cal. 1999) (holding that "the First Amendment provides a fight of
access to ordinary civil trials and proceedings").
131. Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 50 (statement of Seth D. Berlin).
132. Id. (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 55-56 (discussing federal court rulings that have rejected
claims that the First Amendment requires the presence of cameras in court). In general, the furthest that
courts have been prepared to go in promoting television in the courtroom is to suggest that this practice is not
inherently unconstitutional. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573 (198 1).
133. See Kelli L. Sager & Karen N. Frederiksen, Televising the Judicial Branch: In Furtherance of the
Public's First Amendment Rights, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1519, 1539 (1996) (rejecting the notion that "courts can
arbitrarily restrict the public's access to judicial proceedings and discriminate against electronic media absent
a compelling justification for doing so"). See also Specter, supra note 19, at S 10428 ("a strong argument can
be made that forbidding television cameras in the court, while permitting access to print and other media,




terms for different members of the press, this constitutional mandate would not
obviously also demand government to facilitate the varied technologies associated with
different forms of the press. As the Court stated in Estes v. Texas, courts cannot
be said to discriminate where they permit the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom. The television and radio reporter has the same privilege. All are entitled
to the same rights as the general public. The news reporter is not permitted to bring
his typewriter or printing press [or television camera into court].
1 34
Interestingly, if cameras were required in the Supreme Court, the impermissible
discrimination argument might have renewed relevance as print journalists (and,
presumably, bloggers) might complain that they ought to have access to their
computers. Presumably, the Court's decision in the fall of 2006 to make the transcripts
of oral arguments available on the same day they are conducted blunts this argument.
135
The Specter legislation could be understood as making similar primary materials of the
Court's work available, but now, for the medium of television.
In short, while the First Amendment does not obviously pose a barrier to televising
the Court and Specter's legislation, it also does not, on its own, provide a compelling
argument in favor of the constitutionality of the measure.136
5. The Fourteenth Amendment
Could the Fourteenth Amendment, and its so-called "enforcement" provision, serve
as a basis for enacting Specter's television legislation? The Fourteenth Amendment
stipulates that:
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 137
The Court has ruled that these protections apply equally to the federal government
134. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965). As the Court announced in Estes:
It is said, however, that the freedoms granted in the First Amendment extend a right to the news
media to televise from the courtroom, and that to refuse to honor this privilege is to discriminate
between the newspapers and television. This is a misconception of the rights of the press ... Nor
can the courts be said to discriminate where they permit the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom. The television and radio reporter has the same privilege. All are entitled to the same
rights as the general public. The news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press. When the advances in these arts permit reporting by printing press or by television without
their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.
Id.
135. See Press Release, United States Supreme Court, supra note 31.
136. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 40 (statement of Barbara E. Bergman, President of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (arguing that "[t]he question of whether cameras
should be permitted in the federal courts cannot be answered merely by invoking the media's or public's
'right of access').
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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through the Fifth Amendment. 138 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Could one convincingly argue that Section 5 authorizes Congress to pass
S. 344, on the grounds that this bill would help the legislature protect and enforce the
liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
139
This is a difficult case to make. What particular constitutional rights does S. 344
enforce? As the previous analysis makes clear, while televising the Court does not
seem obviously barred by the Constitution, there also does not seem to be an obvious
constitutional basis for insisting that this coverage is required by our supreme law. As
discussed, there is a well-recognized constitutional right of access for the public and,. 140
press to many criminal proceedings. But courts have not extended this right, in any
context, to include legally guaranteed access for television cameras.141
Any effort to defend Specter's bill as an "enforcement" of the Fourteenth
Amendment, would also have to contend with a recent line of Supreme Court cases that
have tamped down on Congress's capacity to legislate pursuant to Section 5. City of
Boerne v. Flores,142 for example, held that Section 5 should be viewed as a "remedial"
power that could only be invoked after Congress satisfied two conditions. 143 First,
Congress had to make a case that the intended legislation addressed genuine
abridgements of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, second, Congress was required to
demonstrate that its chosen legislative means for rectifying these violations were closely
related to this end. 144 In the words of the Court, "[tihere must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in
operation and effect [straying beyond the Fourteenth Amendment]."
145
In light of Boerne and other rulings, 146 advocates of the Specter bill would likely
face a dubious reception from courts in trying to make the case that the legislation was
an appropriate enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents of S. 344 would
need to demonstrate a sufficient record of specific Fourteenth Amendment violations to
establish that the Specter measure is an appropriately tailored legal remedy. Given the
uncertain connection between televising judicial hearings and protecting individual
138. The Fourteenth Amendment's provisions also apply to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
139. See generally Sager & Frederiksen, supra note 133; Todd Piccus, Demystifying the Least Understood
Branch: Opening the Supreme Court to Broadcast Media, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1053 (1993).
140. See supra note 129.
141. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 585-86; Chandler, 449 U.S. at 582-83; Nixon v. Warner Communications,
435 U.S. 589, 610 (1977) ("there is no constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and
broadcast... The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and the
press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed."). See also Dolores K. Sloviter, If Courts Are
Open, Must Cameras Follow? 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 873, 888-89 (1998).
142. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
143. Id. at 519.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 520.
146. For example, in Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001), the
Court invalidated a portion of the Americans with Disabilities Act as being overbroad, viz., that the statute's




liberties, this would, presumably, be an uphill struggle.
147
C. Other Constitutional Arguments
The foregoing analysis has examined both the separation of powers doctrine and
specific powers within the Constitution to determine whether Senator Specter's
proposal, S. 344, is permitted under the United States Constitution. Having made the
case that the legislation does not run afoul of separation of powers principles and is
indeed authorized by several readings of the necessary and proper clause, the following
section goes on to consider whether other specific provisions of the Constitution might
otherwise prevent the proposal from becoming a valid law.
1. The Fifth Amendment and due process
Could Senator Specter's bill, in requiring the televising of Supreme Court sessions,
jeopardize the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law?" The immediate answer is no, because S. 344 contains a provision that allows a
majority of the Justices to stop the television cameras if the cameras "would violate the
due process rights of one or more of the parties" before the Court. 148  But if this
provision was not invoked by the Justices, 149 or if it were stripped from the final version
of Specter's bill, would "Supreme Court TV" otherwise be in jeopardy on "due process
grounds?"
150 rvre
Although the Court, more than forty years ago in Estes v. Texas, reversed a
criminal conviction partly due to concerns that television coverage of the case was
prejudicial, the judiciary has generally not subsequently found that the presence of
cameras in courts undermines fair procedure. 15 1 Indeed, Estes itself suggested that the
disruption posed by cameras in that case might well disappear in the future:
147. But cf Akhil Amar, The Constitution Versus the Court: Some Thoughts on Hills on Amar, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 205, 210 (1999) (criticizing the Court's "neutering" of Section 5); Michael McConnell, Institutions
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, Ill HARV. L. REV. 153, 179 (1997) (arguing that
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended Congress not the Court to be primarily responsible for
interpreting its scope); Ellen Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2349-51 (2003) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to prevent violations of rights by individuals and not simply to bar their
encroachment by government officials).
148. See Specter, supra note 19, at S10426 (statement of Mr. Specter).
149. While unlikely, it is not inconceivable that the Justices could change their mind after the initial
decision about whether to turn the cameras off. In other words, even if the Justices failed to halt the cameras
at the time of an oral argument, presumably they could still rule later that a defendant's due process rights had
been violated by this coverage. Among other scenarios, this might occur if a new Justice were added to the
Court during the period between oral argument on a case and the issuing of a decision.
150. Estes, 381 U.S. at 565.
151. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 73 (statement of Barbara Cochran, President,
Radio-Television News Directors Association) ("In the hundreds of thousands ofjudicial proceedings covered
electronically across the country since 1981, to the best of RTNDA's knowledge there has not been a single
case where the presence of a courtroom camera has resulted in a verdict being overturned, or where a camera
was found to have any effect whatsoever on the ultimate result").
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the day may come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the
daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood that its use in
courtrooms may disparage the judicial process. If and when that day arrives the
constitutional judgment called for now would of course be subject to re-examination
in accordance with the traditional workings of the Due Process Clause. 1
52
Thus, even setting aside the explicit "due process" provision of S. 344, the bill does
not inherently pose a Fifth Amendment problem. While it is conceivable that the
presence of television cameras could threaten the rights of an individual in a specific
case, a reviewing court could simply invalidate the result in that particular dispute.1
53
2. Sixth Amendment guarantees
The Sixth Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."'15 4  Could this
guarantee be somehow compromised by the proposed television legislation?1
55
Since S. 344 is limited to televising the Supreme Court of the United States, this
concern could only take one of two forms. First, one might claim that the Court's
limited exercise of original jurisdiction sometimes amounts to a criminal trial. In
practice, the only category of cases under the Court's original jurisdiction in which this
is likely to occur is in criminal "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls."' 156  However, given both the infrequency with which the Court reviews
original jurisdiction claims involving ambassadors and the criminal immunity that
attaches to most diplomatic offices and acts, 157 it is unlikely that a defendant could
successfully raise such a challenge (even if one could make the case that the Court's
review of these cases equated with a trial as delineated in the Sixth Amendment).
152. Estes, 381 U.S. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
153. A sign of how unthreatening "cameras in the courtroom" may be at the appellate level is suggested
by the statement of the President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers during Senate
hearings on television legislation in 2005. According to Bergman:
cameras should be permitted to televise criminal proceedings in the United States district courts
and interlocutory appeals to the Circuit Courts with the express consent of the parties; cameras
should be permitted in the United States Courts of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in
all other criminal proceedings.
Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 44 (statement of Barbara R. Bergman, President, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). Here, the head of the principal national organization for defense
lawyers seems to foresee no due process concerns posed by cameras in the Supreme Court.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
155. Alternatively one might ask if the Sixth Amendment gives Congress a constitutional authority for
passing S. 344. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) ("there can be little doubt that the explicit
Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment
right of the press and public"). But, among other objections to this argument, the overwhelming percentage of
the Court's docket is comprised of appellate matters. Even with a capacious imagination, therefore, "Supreme
Court TV" could not, therefore, be justified as advancing the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial.
156. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Constitution also grants the Court original jurisdiction in those cases
"in which a state shall be party." In practice this includes: (1) some cases initiated by a state, (2) disputes
between a state and the federal government, and (3) disputes between states. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT
supra note 74, at 9.




As a second argument against S. 344, one might contend that even if the Supreme
Court does not ever serve as a criminal trial court, the Specter proposal might indirectly
impinge upon the Sixth Amendment during the appellate process. That is, if the
presence of television cameras in the Court effectively damages or hampers a party's
right to appeal, this coverage might indirectly threaten their right to enjoy a fair trial.
But this, too, is a strained and unconvincing argument. The federal right to appeal
has been created by statute. 158 There is no constitutionally based right to appeal and no
right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 159  Whatever the "right to trial" includes,
therefore, it would not obviously be hindered by any supposed defects caused by the
televising of Court proceedings.
3. Unconstitutional Legislative Motives or Purposes?
Some might dismiss these various claims regarding the constitutionality of the
recent television legislation as being beside the point. What's really at stake in this
debate is protecting the Court from an ill-tempered and partisan Congress, intent on
harassing the judiciary, and even clipping its wings. In this view, the motivation behind
Specter's bill is not to provide greater accountability or to educate the public, but to
enact a form of punitive revenge for the Court's nullification of various federal laws. 
160
On one level, it's hard to see how this objection amounts to a damning
constitutional argument against the proposed television legislation. With good reason,
courts have been reluctant to look at congressional motives for enacting legislation.
161
As it announced in United States v. 0 'Brien, the Supreme Court does "not strike down
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive."' 162  Making its constitutional judgments turn on the purity of "legislative
motives" would compel the Court to provide authoritative pronouncements on the
obscure psychology and incentives of legislators, in large part by attaching a great deal
of significance to what is often a spotty and even inscrutable legislative record. 
163
However, this response is incomplete. While it is a dubious, if not impossible,
enterprise to assess accurately the incentives and motives of individual lawmakers, not
to mention an entire Congress, 164 trying to capture the legislative purposes behind a bill
is a more manageable, although still difficult, task. It is relatively commonplace for
courts to inspect legislative purposes while, for example, attempting to discern whether
a particular legislative classification meets a "rational basis" or "rational standard"
158. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3732, 3742 (2000).
159. See Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 9-10 (statement of Seth D. Berlin) (discussing
federal court rulings that have rejected claims that the Sixth Amendment requires the presence of cameras in
court).
160. See Service Constitution, supra note 9; Post, supra note 9.
161. In 1801, Congress altered the length of the term of the Court so that it did not meet for fourteen
months, and sixty-five years later it restricted the number of Justices who could serve on the Court in order to
limit the powers of President Andrew Johnson. S. Doc. No. 108-19, at 628-29 (2004). These moves (each
seemingly more drastic than Specter's proposal) were surely partly impelled by partisan motivations, but few
have questioned their constitutionality.
162. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
163. See Bruce G. Peabody, Reversing Time's Arrow: Law's Reordering of Chronology, Causality, and




test. 165  In general, if courts fail to find a valid public purpose behind a piece of
legislation, then it tends to be struck down.
Thus, investigating the legislative purposes behind S. 344 might be relevant to
ascertaining its constitutionality in at least three ways. First, if the purposes of the bill
are somehow themselves unconstitutional, a case could be made that the bill itself is
also invalid. For example, if the reasons cited by legislators for supporting S. 344
centered on curbing the "judicial power," or if proponents offered no rationale
whatsoever, the bill would be constitutionally suspect. 1
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Second, plumbing legislative purposes could be central if one accepts a reading of
the necessary and proper clause that assesses the validity of congressional regulations of
the judiciary by determining whether they are primarily "procedural" rather than
"substantive." ' 167 If one adopts this approach, then, presumably, we might designate S.
344 as an unconstitutional, substantive interference with the Court (if, for example,
most lawmakers intended that the initiative would impact the content of the Court's
decisions in some way).
Third, examining congressional discussions about the rationale for the television
bill might support or erode other arguments about how the measure serves as a
constitutional application of the necessary and proper clause. Presumably, for example,
if there is no record of Congress evincing interest in promoting Court operations, an
argument that S. 344 advances the "judicial power" of the Court is somewhat harder to
establish.
How can we evaluate the Specter legislation in light of these arguments about
legislative purposes? Given the conciseness of the bill and the absence of a developed
legislative record on the measure, it is hard to argue decisively about its intended
objectives. A thorough analysis of the legislative purposes behind S. 344 could only
take place in the future, after Congress has fully considered and debated the bill.
Nevertheless, we might make a few initial comments about the presumed rationale
behind the television legislation, and how this relates to our assessments about its
constitutionality. Senator Specter himself has declared that:
[t]he purpose of this legislation is to open the Supreme Court doors so that more
Americans can see the process by which the Court reaches critical decisions of law
that affect this country and everyday Americans. Because the Supreme Court of the
United States holds power to decide cutting-edge questions on public policy, thereby
effectively becoming a virtual "super legislature," the public has a right to know what
the Supreme Court is doing. And that right would be substantially enhanced by
televising the oral arguments of the Court so that the public can see and hear the
issues presented to the Court. With this information, the public would have insight
into key issues and be better equipped to understand the impact of the Court's
165. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) ("cities, states and the
Federal Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except
upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation").
166. Cf Linda S. Mullinex, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of
Power, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1284, 1287 (1993) (asserting that federal courts possess "inherent Article III power
to control their internal process and the conduct of civil litigation").




Specter has also expressed support for his recent television legislation and similar
measures on the grounds that these initiatives represent reasonable responses to the
Supreme Court's activism and invalidation of federal law. A law requiring televised
Court proceedings might place some "legitimate pressure" on the high bench. 
169
If one assumes that the reasons Specter advances for supporting his bill are not
idiosyncratic and will reflect the public declarations of other legislators, 17 what can we
infer from his remarks? Much of Specter's argument for televising the Supreme Court
focuses on two principal goals: first, educating the public by making information about
the Court's personnel and work more available, and second, providing the public with a
vital instrument for scrutinizing the Justices and ensuring their accountability. Some of
Specter's language also intimates that Congress should pass the bill to punish or
pressure the Court, so that its decisions will fall in line with the wishes of national
majorities.
Are any of these reasons for supporting S. 344 so constitutionally suspect as to
render the entire bill invalid? 171  The arguments Specter offers certainly are
"rational"--meeting the minimal standards the Court has imposed in scrutinizing
legislative purposes. While it would seem difficult to impugn the first two legislative
motives as rendering the measure unconstitutional, a case might be made that the last
argument possesses a more dubious character.
But this rationale represents only one strand of Specter's public justification for the
bill; one he does not emphasize relative to the other stated purposes. Moreover, the
proper basis for determining whether Specter's "pressure" remarks implicate the bill's
constitutionality would seem to be a direct separation of powers analysis, and not an
indirect inspection of whether the bill's purposes violated this doctrine. In other words,
if, as argued previously, the bill itself doesn't violate the separation of powers, it is
difficult to imagine that it might still be deemed unconstitutional because its supporters
somehow intended to encroach upon the Court.
Setting aside these arguments about unconstitutional motives, could a close
inspection of the legislature's justification for the television legislation reveal that this is
a largely "substantive" rather than "procedural" regulation, and is therefore
constitutionally void under one of the tests used by courts in applying the "necessary
and proper" clause? Again, a complete evaluation of this argument would require a full
168. See Specter, supra note 19, at S10427. Again, while these remarks were made about S. 1768 (the
version of the television legislation introduced in the 109th Congress) they are presumably applicable to S.
344 (the identical bill introduced by Specter in January 2007). Cf 153 CONG. REC. S 1259 (daily ed. Jan. 29,
2007) (quoting Chief Justice William Howard Taft's statement that "[n]othing tends more to render judges
careful in their decision and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of
theirs is subject to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men and to candid criticism").
169. Mauro, Bill Allowing Cameras, supra note 43, at 13.
170. Specter's arguments were certainly echoed by his colleagues during the Senate's 2005 hearings.
See, e.g., Cameras in the Courtroom, supra note 18, at 78 (statement of Sen. John Comyn), 88-89 (statement
of Sen. Russ Feingold), 90-91 (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley).
171. This question also raises additional, complex matters beyond the scope of this Article: what
concentration of a dubious motive is required to render a bill constitutionally impermissible-and how is that
assessment to be determined? Is it enough if one legislator has an unconstitutional motive? Or is a majority
required? And what do we do with lawmakers who have mixed motives?
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accounting of the legislative debates on S. 344, a record that is not yet available. If the
congressional deliberations established that the primary goal moving the bill's
supporters was their interest in shaping the Court's opinions, 172 we would possess some
basis for stamping the bill as intending a substantive outcome, rather than providing
procedural rules "necessary" for enabling the Court to function. Presumably an even
more pertinent analysis would entail addressing whether Congress actually impeded the
Court's Article III powers.
In any event, lawmakers' reasons for supporting the bill are certain to be complex
and multiple. 173 Moreover, even if one could establish that the purposes of the bill were
somehow distinctively "substantive," this contention would run up against the language
and nature of S. 344 itself, a bill which alters how the Court presents itself to the public.
The proposed law largely expands the means through which the Court performs a
portion of its basic operations. This character of S. 344 appears to mark it as a
procedural measure on its face, no matter the underlying purposes of its author and
supporters.
D. Summary
Even if S. 344 becomes a public law, it is likely to be challenged in the courts on
constitutional grounds. 74 This Article contends, however, that there are good reasons
for believing that the measure is consonant with the legislative powers enumerated in
the Constitution without threatening judicial prerogatives or individual rights. After
taking into account the range of constitutional arguments that might be made both for
and against the legislation, the Specter proposal would appear to be a reasonable
extension of Congress's powers under the necessary and proper clause to specify the
means through which the Court makes some of its proceedings available to the public.
Are there any constitutional constraints governing Congress's regulation of the
Court's internal proceedings? Some legislative measures would seemingly go too far in
managing the way the Court conducts its business, encroaching on the judiciary's
independence and primary functions. A bill forcing the Justices to turn over
unpublished notes about their preliminary deliberations and votes on cases, for example,
would seem to compromise their ability to speak freely and imaginatively while still
mulling over their opinions. A proposal mandating that Justices answer questions from
the press and public would add institutional duties that do not obviously arise from
either our Constitution or our legal traditions. But unlike these hypothetical measures,
Specter's proposal, which regulates and expands the mechanisms through which the
172. While some of Specter's remarks indicate an interest in a kind of "payback" for the Court's activism,
it is not obvious this is a central focus of his support of S. 344, or that he intends any direct shaping of the
Court's judgments with his television legislation.
173. At least one Court opinion has ruled that where it is difficult to classify a bill as being either
substantive or procedural, the measure is presumed valid. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472. See also supra notes 111,
112 and 115, and accompanying text.
174. See generally Richard Pious, Public Law and the "Executive" Constitution, in EXECUTING THE
CONSTITUTION: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT BACK INTO THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher S. Kelley, ed., 2001)
(exploring the question of whether "courts are more likely to rule against Presidents or Congress-rather than




Court publicizes its already open sessions, is a defensible way to keep the nation's
highest court open, available, and legitimate.
V. THE PROSPECTS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDOFF AND THE FATE OF S. 344
Despite the strength of the constitutional case for Specter's measure, it could still
give rise to a legal and institutional standoff between Congress and the Court. As
indicated, a number of sitting Justices have expressed serious misgivings about the
potential effects of television coverage upon the Court and its members. In its starkest
form, this opposition has included Justice David Souter's warning-a decade old, but
never repudiated-that cameras would only enter the Court "over my dead body."
175
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia has, at times, sounded nearly as skeptical. "We don't
want to become entertainment," he warned. "I think there's something sick about
making entertainment out of real people's legal problems. I don't like it in the lower
courts, and I particularly don't like it in the Supreme Court."
' 1 76
But would this opposition actually endanger the proposed television legislation?
Clearly, the attitudes of the Justices and other judicial figures would figure prominently
in the public debate surrounding S. 344, as well as in the judgments of lawmakers
voting on the bill and the President called on to sign or veto the measure. In general,
Congress does not have an especially enviable historical record when attempting to curb
the powers of the Court directly. 177 But, as indicated, the political context surrounding
Specter's bill looks more favorable. In addition to its bipartisan support, especially
helpful in a period of divided government, the bill allows Congress to give vent to its
simmering frustration with the Court, but in a manner that is likely to be better received
by a public that is generally deferential to the judiciary.178 As noted, Specter's initiative
is among the most modest of a recent spate of proposals calling for constraints on or
reforms of the judiciary.
In the end, as with most legislative battles, the political fate of the television
legislation is likely to turn on how the measure is framed by its proponents and political
timing. Polling consistently finds that a substantially higher percentage of the public
approves of the Supreme Court's institutional performance relative to Congress.
179
With this background in mind, Specter's measure stands the greatest chance of
175. On Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, 'Over My Dead Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1996, at
A24.
176. TONG, supra note 16, at 12. See generally C-SPAN, Cameras in the Court, http://www.c-
span.org/camerasinthecourt/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (presenting statements by the Justices of the Supreme
Court on cameras in the Court).
177. See, e.g., RICHARD PACELLE, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 77-103 (2001); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 327-29 (1993); Service Constitution, supra note 9, at 289-93. See
generally Barry Friedman, Attacks on Judges: Why They Fail, 81 JUDICATURE 150, 150-51(1998) (reviewing
the history of popular attacks on judges); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS
COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006) (discussing the history of
congressional efforts to curb the courts).
178. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY, supra note 37, at 29-35; Valerie J.
Hoekstra, The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An Experimental Study of the Court's Ability to Change
Opinion, 23 AM. POL Q. 109, 122 (1995); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, The Dynamics of
Public Support for the Supreme Court, 59 J. POL. 1114, 1115-1116 (1997).
179. See HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY, supra note 37, at 31.
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becoming law if Congress can depict the measure as an essential element of maintaining
government access and accountability-rather than directly exhorting the public to
place their faith in the comparative competence, integrity, and sagacity of the
legislature. 18 Since the 2000 election controversy, when media and popular interest in
the Court's proceedings hit a contemporary peak, 18 1 commentators and politicians have
called for greater access to our highest tribunal. The Specter bill could be packaged as
being an effective and relatively unobtrusive tool for satisfying this widespread and
enduring curiosity. 1
82
The television legislation would also, obviously, benefit from good luck. While
Congress could have a decisive impact on the nature and content of any publicity
campaign accompanying Specter's bill, it would have less control over another decisive
factor: the Court's capacity to produce a "self-inflicted wound." 183 As indicated, the
public generally evinces considerable respect for the Court, at least relative to Congress.
However, controversial Court decisions can have a short term impact in dampening the
public's trust in the high bench. 184 The most notable recent example occurred in 2005,
when, on the heels of the Court's contentious "takings" decision, Kelo v. City of New
London, public approval of the Court dipped below that of Congress. 185 The political
fortunes of S. 344 would, therefore, certainly soar if a vote on the measure were
scheduled in the aftermath of an unpopular and well-publicized opinion by the Court.
Suppose S. 344 becomes law, generating sufficient political support to pass
Congress and either avoiding or overcoming a presidential veto. The obvious next step
for the measure would be its challenge in federal court. 186 Even as it has attempted to
make a case for the legal validity of the Specter television legislation, this Article has
also outlined a number of arguments that might be advanced in challenging its
constitutionality.
At least two questions would be raised at this stage of the legal trajectory of S. 344.
First, would the Justices of the Supreme Court be authorized to review the constitutional
status of the Specter initiative? Justices are purportedly limited by 28 U.S.C. § 455, the
180. Id.
181. Mauro, Bill Allowing Cameras, supra note 43, at 13 ("One factor cited by several witnesses is the
renewed public interest in the Supreme Court, beginning with Bush v. Gore in 2000 and continuing with this
year's confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts Jr.").
182. Even if the central claims in this piece are defensible-and Specter's bill is able to withstand the
legal challenges that will surely be raised against it-there is a broader question as to whether the public (and
public officials) would countenance a proposal that some will present as disrupting an institutional
equilibrium between the Court and Congress. The potential reluctance of the public (and some elites) to
support S. 344 might reflect not only concerns that the bill infringes upon the Court as a legal matter, but
could also upset a more amorphous constitutional aesthetics or propriety. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter,
Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 357, 358 (1990) (discussing constitutional "improprieties" as legal phenomena that may be deemed
constitutional but are still arguably "contrary to the spirit of the Constitution").
183. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1928).
184. Moreover, as the Congressional Research Service suggests, public opinion on televising the Supreme
Court may be shifting towards greater coverage. TONG, supra note 16, at I (discussing recent polling that
indicates increased public "support for televising Supreme Court proceedings").
185. Jeffrey M. Jones, Supreme Court Approval Rating Best in Four Years, Six in 10 Approve of the Job
the Court is Doing, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 2006, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/
newstheswamp/2006/09/supreme-courtg.html.
186. Among the significant legal issues not considered by this Article is the question of who would have
standing to challenge an enacted S. 344.
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portion of the United States Code that sets out criteria for when a "justice [sic], judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'
187
Despite this seemingly broad and encompassing language, it is unclear whether this
recusal provision would actually deter the Court from exercising judicial review with
respect to an enacted S. 344.188 Among other considerations, in practice, judges and
Justices have always been their own arbiters of this impartiality rule-that is, they have
determined for themselves, with almost no formal guidelines, when they should remove
themselves from a case. 189
If the Justices did review a challenge to the Specter legislation, it could pose a
second significant legal question: would this litigation spark a renewed struggle
between Congress and the Court over who had final authority to resolve the question of
the measure's constitutional status? 190  Notwithstanding this Article's claim that a
strong case can be made that the Specter bill is consistent with the Constitution,
Congress would be unlikely to challenge directly the Court's judgment on this matter,
even if the high bench struck down the law. The Court's frequent invocations of
"judicial supremacy,"' 19 1 along with the political advantages afforded by this
doctrine, 192 have left federal lawmakers reluctant to contest the authority of the Court to
serve as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional questions. 93  Even Senator Specter has
stated his commitment to recognizing the "final word" of the Supreme Court in
187. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000). See also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 8-13 (C.B.
Macpherson, ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
188. The scope of 28 U.S.C. § 455 is unclear, particularly since the specific grounds upon which judges
and Justices are required to recuse themselves under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) are more specific than the general
goals set out in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 28 U.S.C. § 455. See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal and
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 641 (1987). The Justices' refusal to disqualify themselves in this instance
appears unlikely to amount to a due process violation. Cf Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-
25 (1986) (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)) (Alabama Supreme Court
member's "direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest... was sufficient to establish a violation of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
189. See Emily Yoffe, When Do Supreme Court Justices Recuse Themselves?, SLATE, Oct. 2, 2000,
http://www.slate.com/id/1006177/. Moreover, even if they failed to recuse themselves, it is unclear who
would have standing to challenge this recusal, and whether and on what grounds another court would review
this claim. See generally Thomas McKevitt, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification Really
Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1996) (Rule applies "if no judge can be found who possesses the
requisite degree of partiality"). Of course, if Congress mandated cameras only in the Supreme Court, all
other federal judges would conceivably possess the requisite impartiality.
190. While many still assume this is a straightforward legal question, a burgeoning scholarship suggests
otherwise. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 49, at 106-11; KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 (1999). See generally CONGRESS
AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10 (discussing various ways in which Congress contributes to the
formation of constitutional law and the protection of constitutional values); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217 (1994) (arguing for the
authority of the President, and, by extension, all three branches, to engage in constitutional interpretation).
191. Judicial supremacy is the doctrine that the constitutional interpretation of the Court trumps other
readings of the Constitution. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (stating the
people's belief in being a nation ruled by law "is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their
constitutional ideals").
192. See Mark Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Problem: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD.
AMER. POL. DEv. 35, 44 (1993) (discussing circumstances in which it is politically beneficial for political
figures to hand off decisions to the courts).
193. Congressional Interpretation, supra note 11, at 164.
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evaluating the constitutionality of S. 344, although the Senator has also indicated that
"there is clearly no constitutional prohibition against" requiring the Court "to televise its
proceedings."1
94
Of course, even an adverse constitutional ruling by the Court would not terminate
political efforts to televise its proceedings. As scholars and public officials have
frequently pointed out, there are numerous potential controls and levers Congress might
employ in attempting to impose its will upon the Justices. 195 To take just one example,
Congress might exercise its Article III authority to remove the Court's appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the televising issue, a move that would lead to its own
rounds of legal and political challenges and an unknown resolution. 
196
VI. CONCLUSION: LEGISLATIVE "ESCAPE VELOCITY" AND JUDICIAL REFORM
This discussion suggests that even if S. 344 is passed into law, the immediate fate
of "Supreme Court TV" is still unclear. However, as a number of commentators have
suggested, there are compelling reasons for believing that in the proximate future,
televised sessions of the Supreme Court will become a part of the American political
landscape. 197
The broader significance of this development would need to be assessed on at least
two levels. First, and most obviously, if some bill like Specter's becomes and remains
valid law, it is an open question as to what, if any, effects it would have on the Justices'
behavior, the operation of the Court more generally, and how the high bench is regarded
by the public. Would, for example, "Supreme Court TV" induce greater concern by the
Justices for how they are perceived by the general public, and would this have any
effect on how they question attorneys and construct their opinions?
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But beyond this issue, Specter's proposal could be meaningful in giving wider play
to a set of conversations that have long been coursing through the academy about the
relationship between the Court and Congress, and the public's part in supervising both
branches. 199 In this way, if the measure survives the gauntlet of legal and political
194. See Specter, supra note 19, at S10426-S10430.
195. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 29-52 (2004); FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 49, at 200-30.
196. See, e.g., Service Constitution, supra note 9, at 293-94.
197. Lithwick, supra note 38 (claiming that the presence of cameras in the Court is inevitable).
198. See BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES, supra note 71, at 4, 60-72, 118-135 (2006) (discussing
judges' "regard of salient audiences" including the "general public" and particular "policy groups"); Day to
Day, supra note 14 (discussing the supposed threat of Justices "acting up" for the television cameras).
199. See generally JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004) (examining Congress's efforts to overrule the courts'
statutory interpretations); RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
PROCESS (2006) (reviewing and criticizing the current process for selecting and confirming Supreme Court
Justices); LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS (2005) (reviewing the play of a variety of political factors in the judicial appointment
process); FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, supra note 49 (analyzing the respective roles of the
Congress, Court, presidency, and various interest groups and popular forces in shaping constitutional law);
GEYH, supra note 177 (discussing congressional efforts to curb the courts); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS
AND CONGRESS (1997) (examining the relationship between Congress, the federal judiciary, and "good
governance"); EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND
ABORTION (1989) (analyzing Congress's power to curb the jurisdiction of courts); DONALD MORGAN,
2007]
Journal of Legislation
challenges it will inevitably face, S. 344 could stimulate a more general discussion
about whether other reforms of the Court might be in order. For example, scholars from
the left and right have long circulated proposals for imposing term limits on the Justices
or for directly curbing judicial supremacy.20 Still other commentators have called for
taking steps to promote greater judicial independence by, for example, increasing
judicial salaries or urging greater deference to the Court's decision making authority.
20 1
In numerous ways our constitutional order is designed to slow and deter significant
change within and between our governing institutions. 202 However, if S. 344 has the
"escape velocity" to pull away from the political forces that normally mitigate against
major shifts in the power dynamics of our nation's capital, it could become a case study
for reform and give rise to a more wide-ranging and creative rethinking of the role and
status of the judiciary--especially given the discontent that has been percolating
amongst at least some of our nation's policy leaders and the public they serve.
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 269-91 (1966) (historical study of
Congress's capacity to contribute to constitutional interpretation); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a
Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957) (discussing the
Court's relationship to governing coalitions and its institutional role in a democracy); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SC. REv. 28
(1997) (examining the degree to which Supreme Court Justices vote their "sincere policy preferences"
irrespective of the preferences of Congress).
200. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When do Lawmakers Threaten Judicial Independence?, 34 TRIAL 62,
63-64 (1998).
201. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Of Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L.
REv. 1359, 1387 (1997); Chemerinsky, supra note 200, at 62, 67-71; Friedman, supra note 177, at 150-51;
Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Address at the Arab Judicial
Forum: The Importance of Judicial Independence (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0304/ijde/oconnor.htm.
202. The institutions and rules of our constitutional system generally gravitate against legislative change.
In the words of the Federalist, "inconstancy and mutability in the laws ... form the greatest blemish in the
character and genius of our governments." THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). Indeed, Hamilton
concludes,
every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same
state in which they happen to be at any given period, [is] much more likely to do good than harm;
because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury which may
possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will b6 amply compensated by the advantage of
preventing a number of bad ones.
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